Abstract We present a model of strategic network formation with absolute friction and heterogeneous agents. The individual payoffs from a given network are determined by the difference of an agent specific utility function that depends on the number of her direct links and the sum of her link-costs. These link-costs decompose in a symmetric function that represents the social distance between the two agents and an agent specific function representing the partner's quality. From a theoretical point of view, we analyze strong pairwise stable networks (Belleflamme and Bloch, Int Econ Rev 45(2): 2004) and show that our model always has a unique strong pairwise stable network which is also strongly stable (Dutta and Mutuswami, J Econ Theory, 76:322-344, 1997). From a practical point of view, we provide an algorithm that reproduces this stable network from information on the individual payoff structure. We illustrate the use of this algorithm by applying it to an informal risk sharing network data set from the village of Nyakatoke in rural Tanzania.
Introduction and Motivation
We present a model of strategic network formation with absolute friction and heterogeneity among agents. We show that our model always has a unique network that is strong pairwise stable. We provide an algorithm to compute this network and we illustrate its use by applying it to a data set of a risk sharing network in small village in Tanzania.
Overview Social networks are among the most valuable contributors to apprehend modern human life. They determine, among others, communication, friendship, trust, marriage, trade, risk sharing and wealth. In order to understand these phenomena it is crucial to study how these networks are formed and what a stable network looks like when agents are able to form and/or cut links. This insight has lead to an enormous growth of scientific research analyzing the development, stability and empirical regularities of social networks.
In this research we present a model of strategic network formation. Our model has three important features. First, the model assumes that link formation is only possible under mutual consent. This means that in order to establish a link, two agents have to agree to form this link, while every agent can unilaterally decide to cut a pre-existing link (see Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). This feature distinguishes our research from models of unilateral link formation. 1 In models of unilateral link formation, any agent can unilaterally decide to link with another agent. In addition, our model does not allow for transfers between agents, where it is possible that one agent compensates another agent for the formation a link between them. 2 Second, our model allows for a wide range of heterogeneity in the determination of the link-costs. The link-cost is the cost that each agent incurs when adding a certain link. Third, we restrict ourselves to networks with absolute friction. This means that the benefits of a certain link only attribute to the two agents that form this link, excluding any spillover to other agents. In this section, we discuss each of these three features in more detail. This will allow us to position and distinguish our research from other research in the network formation literature.
Bilateral link formation
We assume that links can only be formed under mutual consent. In particular, no agent can form a link with another agent without the agreement of this agent but any agent can unilaterally decide to cut an existing link (see Myerson 1977 Myerson , 1991 Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) . We say that a network is stable if there is no coalition of agents that can alter the network in such a way that at least one agent in the coalition benefits from the change without any agent in the coalition losing from the change. 3 This definition hinges on two further specifications. First, we need
